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ABSTRACT
This paper fi rst discusses features of the Third Energy Package” of EU legislation 
regarding electricity transmission system operators (TSOs), which has been in place 
since 2009. The Package envisages three different types of TSO organization: full 
ownership unbundling (OU), independent system operator (ISO), and independent 
transmission operator (ITO). The question of economic effi ciency of the three possi-
ble settings occupies much of researchers’ attention. Here we argue that the results 
of basic economic analytical models depend critically on whether the regulatory 
function is deemed effi ciently executed, or not.  Next, challenges posed in front of 
TSOs by rapid decarbonization of power systems are briefl y discussed, too. The main 
conclusion is that the answer to a question which of the three types of TSO orga-
nization from EU regulations is economically most effi cient depends on quality of 
regulator’s performance, which itself cannot be deemed (as often is in the literature) 
perfectly effi cient.
1. INTRODUCTION
Reorganization of electricity system that has been going on since about two 
decades can be viewed in a light of deregulation doctrine which has been 
prevailing in western public policy ever since eighties. In electricity systems 
there are opportunities for competition in generation, wholesale trade, and re-
tail. The networks are generally considered natural monopolies, and proba-
bly no one ever contested that fact. Yet, there have been quite a few debates 
about what should be the way to organize network operators. This question, 
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of course, is not that simple and the answer often depends on one’s personal 
views. Economic science has not yet offered a clear solution, as complexity of 
the problem is tremendous. It is hard to model complicated economic systems 
with simple theoretic models. It may be even harder to defi ne more complex 
models. The literature is anything but unisonous about which of the organi-
zational models from the 3rd Package electricity directive1 is the best from the 
standpoint of either allocative, cost, or technical effi ciency.
In this work we will fi rst give an overview of contemporary economic liter-
ature on transmission system operator organization, with an inevitable con-
clusion that there is no clear conclusion about economic superiority of any of 
them. This will shift our attention to the area of policy choice. Since neither 
of the models can be fi rmly identifi ed as the best, seemingly there is more 
maneuver space for political decision-making regarding that point. However, 
in most of the theoretical works we had read there is an underlying assump-
tion, which cannot be fi rmly supported, that the regulatory system is perfect, 
meaning that it works as it is (theoretically) supposed to. Thus, assuming that 
the regulatory system is not doing the job in the best possible way in any of 
the three above mentioned aspects, the ownership unbundling model would 
emerge as probably the least problematic canonic model among the three from 
the 3rd Package’s catalog, given the current EU circumstances in the electricity 
sector. However, the topic still deserves closer attention.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the contemporary literature on the 3rd Package institutional framework for 
TSOs the researchers take several different approaches to the issue. The three 
are most important:
− Authors like Leveque, Glachant, Saguan, Rious, Pollitt, Bolle, Breitmoser, 
Brunekreeft and others analyze economic aspects of TSO designs, trying 
to identify which of the three is optimal regarding social cost-benefi t. They 
usually try to rationalize the debate, however, this proved not to be too easy 
because the phenomena studied in their works are quite complex and con-
sequently, the economic models employed were too coarse to give way for 
clear-cut conclusions.
− Some authors, e.g. Thomas, who is one of the most active, try to prove that 
the European Commission (EC) has not been successful in proving and 
justifying its course of action, which originally aimed to retain the owner-
1  European Community (2009b).
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ship unbundling (OU) solution as the only one legally allowed. Therefore, 
supposedly, the EC should not have favored the OU and forced the network 
owners to divest their historic assets neither by the law, nor by rigid anti-
trust enforcement. However, one can object to such an argumentation that 
legislatures are bound by constitutional limitations only and that they really 
do not have to prove their cases in a way court procedure would require.
− Finally, there are authors, for example Willis, Diathesopoulos, and others, 
who analyze relevant European antitrust case-law which infl uenced pro-
cesses around formation of contemporary EC policies regarding transmis-
sion system operation in an ex-post manner. They are important for under-
standing of the logic of EU antitrust law enforcement that can be expected 
in future cases, since apparently the EC tends to use this legal tool to foster 
implementation of the rules.
An extensive analysis of the infl uence of TSO institutional arrangements on 
overall social benefi t can be found in Pollitt’s works2. He compares fi ve in-
stitutional settings regarding their social cost-benefi t: (i) Independent TSO 
(equivalent to OU from the 3rd Package); (ii) Legally unbundled TSO (equiv-
alent to 3rd Package’s ITO); (iii) Independent System Operator (equivalent to 
ISO from the 3rd Package); (iv) Hybrid ISO/TO operation (where both ISO 
and Transmission Owner are fully unbundled), and; (v) Traditional vertical-
ly integrated utility (VIU). These fi ve arrangements were compared across a 
number of aspects: (1) effects on market competition; (2) ease and effi ciency 
of regulation; (3) privatization aspects; (4) security of supply; (5) transaction 
costs of unbundling; (6) cost of capital and investment costs; (7) synergy and 
focusing effects; (8) double marginalization; (9) probability of foreign take-
over; and (10) risk of voluntary government intervention. Pollitt concludes that 
the full OU is the best possible solution regarding overall social cost-benefi t 
but for cost of capital as a fully unbundled operator as relatively small part of 
a system can lose a portion of its credit rating. He also refutes conclusions of 
other authors3 that the LTSO is the optimal arrangement. He notes that in the 
jurisdictions with most successful electricity sector reforms (New Zeeland, 
Victoria & South Australia, Chile, Argentina, Nordic countries, UK, New 
York, Texas, PJM) system operation has been independent from generation 
interests, without exemption. On the other hand, countries with slow and un-
successful reforms (France, Germany, California) had not made the system 
operation fully independent. An apparent advantage of the LTSO option in 
achieving better transmission investment adequacy and lower cost of capital 
2  Pollit (2007a); Pollit (2007b).
3  Bolle and Breitmoser (2006).
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may as well be diminished or nullifi ed by diffi culties in regulatory oversight of 
a bundled structure and discrimination issues linked to it. As Pollitt notes, this 
could be a signifi cant problem especially in less developed EU states as their 
regulatory authorities may not be suffi ciently mature, yet. Further, if legal un-
bundling itself were implemented in a correct manner, the mutual ownership 
effects would be questionable. Therefore, the whole concept of LTSO may be 
questionable, too (that is, if the real political goal was not to actually obstruct 
the market reform). As regards regulatory oversight, OU and hybrid ISO/TO 
may require notably more effort from regulators than e.g. state-owned VIUs or 
LTSOs due to bigger information asymmetries and more market transactions. 
Moreover, vertically integrated utilities require rather an anti-trust monitoring 
than regulation, especially if private. To conclude, Pollitt prefers full unbun-
dling of the TSOs as the socially most acceptable institutional arrangement.
The French school of power system economists tries to introduce more ra-
tionality into otherwise afl ame EU-wide discussions about optimal TSO de-
sign by taking a new institutional economics approach. Glachant and Rious4 
perform a modular analysis of TSO organization with respect to three basic 
modules each TSO has to have: (i) short-run network externality management 
(i.e. dispatching with congestion management); (ii) network development (i.e. 
long-run congestion management), and; (iii) coordination with neighboring 
TSOs. Leveque et al.5 discuss criteria to compare transmission organizations. 
Assigning different weights to the fi ve factors ((1) transaction cost savings; (2) 
incentive regulation implementation; (3) confl ict of interests issues; (4) nondis-
criminatory network access, and; (5) advantages of regional integration), they 
rank the three standard 3rd Package’s solutions for different circumstances. 
They conclude that the full OU is most the best solution where cost savings 
and correct price signals for investments are crucial. This is the case where the 
transmission system is well connected with neighboring networks while inter-
nal network suffers from congestions. Note for example that quite a number 
of South-East Europe countries can fi t very well into this category6. The ISO 
solution is most suitable for situations where internal networks are suffi ciently 
developed but there is a need for more complex regional inter-TSO coordina-
tion due to insuffi cient interconnection capacities between individual control 
areas. The authors conclude that the European Commission, when ranking 
the options included into the 3rd Package directive7, valued the cost-savings 
and right investment signals the most. They argue that the EC should proceed 
4  Glachant and Rious (2007).
5  Leveque, Glachant, Saguan and De Muizon (2009).
6  Sabolić, Grčić (2010).
7  European Community (2009b).
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with efforts to fi nally accept and legally enforce a unique institutional form 
for TSOs as the coordination between the systems would certainly be more 
effi cient if all the systems shared the same organizational rules. The important 
message from this group’s works is that in different conditions different insti-
tutional settings may be most appropriate. They also, pretty much as the EC, 
consider the ITO arrangement the weakest as it comes to TSO task fulfi llment 
in reformed power sector.
Brunekreeft8 performs a social cost-benefi t analysis of the ownership unbun-
dling with an emphasis on German TSOs. He studies three groups of potential 
effects across a few scenarios on welfare: (i) effects on market competition; (ii) 
effects on interconnection investments, and; (iii) effects on costs due to a loss 
of vertical synergies. He reports that: (1) In most scenarios the welfare change 
is positive but very small in a relative sense. (2) Effects on interconnection 
investments are surprisingly small, which is explained by the fact that, actu-
ally, vertically integrated utilities in countries which are either big importers 
or exporters need interconnections, and therefore, they do not have an interest 
in stopping TSOs from building new ones. On the other hand, (3) Brunekreeft 
found the vertical synergy loss effects very small, too. All in all, the OU solu-
tion is found to have slightly positive welfare effects. The author makes no 
attempt to compare the OU with other arrangements.
Balmert and Brunekreeft9 try to analyze so-called deep-ISO variant of organi-
zation by posing the resolution of confl ict between investment decision making 
and risk taking to the center of their attention. They argue that investment 
tendering (where private parties would be able to invest in transmission assets) 
would resolve this confl ict. However, their conclusion is not really substantiat-
ed, and the question of private investments itself is too complex to be answered 
without much theoretical work or experience. This model is not yet clearly 
identifi ed as a potential future canonic solution in other authors’ works, either.
Bolle and Breitmoser10 compare ownership unbundling (OU) and legal unbun-
dling (ITO) and conclude that legal unbundling leads to lower fi nal electricity 
prices, i.e. to lower total costs in the system. However, one of the underlying 
assumptions of their model was that in legal unbundling setting double mar-
ginalization is completely avoided. Yet, it can be at least partially eliminated 
in cases of vertically unbundled systems, too, by designing multi-part tariffs. 
After all, the present EU law requires tariff separation as obligatory.
8  Brunekreeft (2008).
9  Balmert and Brunekreeft (2009).
10  Bolle and Breitmoser (2006).
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Nardi11 analyzes empirically effects of ownership unbundling on transmission 
capacity investment and quality o f service by comparing on the one hand, 
countries with any kind of unbundling in place against the ones with no un-
bundling at all, and on the other, countries with ownership unbundling against 
all other countries. As regards capacity investments the OU seems superior to 
other arrangements. When it comes to quality of services, it turned out to be 
better in group of countries with any kind of unbundling than in those without 
it. However, the systems with OU seemed to be worse off than the others, al-
though Nardi notes that this result was not statistically signifi cant.
As regards criticism towards the European Commission’s past attempts to pass 
the OU as the only legally allowed option, there certainly has not been a lack 
of journal papers, analyses, political manifests, and all sorts of public activities 
aimed against the EC’s policy orientation. We will cite here only one author 
as a representative of this class. Thomas12 analyzes, more-or-less, semantics 
of the EC’s policy papers, working documents, press releases, and, fi nally, 
pieces of legislative acts, to argue that the Commission had not suffi ciently 
investigated and attested the grounds for its political action aimed at oblig-
atory ownership unbundling. However, strictly speaking, the Commission 
was here merely a drafter of legislation. Had the European Parliament want-
ed to have the case scientifi cally or professionally proved, it would have cer-
tainly asked the Commission to produce some harder evidence. But it had 
not. And of course, the Parliament can pass a piece of legislation even (in a 
principal) on its whim, as long as the Treaty provisions are not breached. The 
policy needs no proof.
Pielow and Ehlers13 analyzed the question of constitutional grounds for oblig-
atory ownership unbundling. They analyze relevant provisions of constitutions 
of Germany, France and Netherlands, addressing the issue of basic freedoms 
of ownership and capital movement, although they never questioned the Com-
mission’s right of legislative initiative, nor general constitutional rights of leg-
islators to limit certain general freedoms when public interests are on stake. 
Certain countries may have some constitutional obstacles in that regard, how-
ever, the example of France shows that these are basically not fundamental and 
that pragmatic solutions can be found. (For example, the French Constitution 
of 1958 required public services to be supplied by publicly owned companies 
but it did not specify which these services are. This was the basis that made 
possible privatization of Gaz de France in 2004.)
11  Nardi (2009).
12  Thomas (2007 a,b,c,).
13  Pielow and Ehlers (2008).
93
D. Sabolić: Electricity transmission and EU rules for energy sector
There is an interesting piece of work on the relation between corruption and 
TSO unbundling14, with an econometric analysis of a relation between Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the level of 
unbundling modeled as a fi ve-level variable. The main statistically signifi cant 
conclusion is that lower degree of unbundling goes with lower CPI (i.e. higher 
perception of corruption). Moreover, newer EU member states have averagely 
lower level of unbundling. Interestingly, higher GDP per capita is associated 
with lower levels of unbundling. Although these results are quite intriguing, 
one can fi nd some methodological problems here: First, the relation of CPI as 
a perception indicator and true level of corruption may be problematic in an 
international context as the same CPI may in the reality mean very different 
situations in different countries with considerably different relevant cultural 
backgrounds. Further, the GDP-unbundling relation may be affected by the 
fact that quite a few very large and high-GDP countries, like Germany and 
France, had at the time lower levels of unbundling. 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Stiglitz15 do not engage specifi cally in electricity 
transmission industry at all (in fact, they analyze international telecommuni-
cations industry from 1987 to 1999 and check the plausibility of the results by 
analyzing a multi-sector sample of European privatization deals from 1989 to 
2006), but they investigate an aspect of ownership change infl uence on acces-
sibility of external fi nancing, which is quite important since an alleged detri-
mental infl uence on fi nancial positions of both former VIU and new TSO has 
been one of the main arguments of ownership unbundling haters” in some 
countries in Europe. In newer EU member states there have been attempts to 
stir up emotions in political arena around the evil of privatization, too.
The conclusions of Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Stiglitz are: (i) Full privatization 
is more likely to happen in industries with weak performances; in states with 
higher fi scal defi cits; in states with a legal system of non-French origin; and in 
larger and wealthier states. (ii) Access to external fi nancing (bank crediting) 
has an important positive impact on future profi ts, investments and growth. 
(iii) Performance changes in years around the ownership change are not very 
sensitive to past fi nancing limitations of public sector. (v) Company perfor-
mances have better prospects to advance in the future if the privatization is 
done later due to the effect of learning an optimal privatization design in given 
circumstances in the sector. (vi) Maturity of capital market in a given state 
is important factor regarding success of privatization. (vii) Newly-privatized 
companies have higher information asymmetries (i.e. less reputation: they are 
14  Van Koten and Ortmann (2008).
15  Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Stiglitz (2009).
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less known to the business community). Since costs of debt are less sensitive to 
information than costs of equity, the access to bank loans is essential. Effects 
on operating performances are more evident in later years after privatization, 
though. (viii) Performances of privatized companies are not better (nor worse) 
than of the ones that stayed under state ownership. The lack of government 
guarantees can increase capital costs on grounds of higher risks, especially 
in early years following privatization. Effects of ownership change (or non-
change) to company performances were statistically equally insignifi cant in 
both examined groups.
To sum up the conclusions stated above, and to translate them to the electricity 
transmission industry, the ownership change itself is not all that important, 
meaning that it cannot be used as a key argument pro et contra either of the 
TSO institutional arrangements. The arguments of state v. private ownership 
are not very important, either. What matters is the availability to external 
sources of capital, which is not more specifi cally related to the electricity 
transmission business, than any other one.
The last group of works we want to discuss here sheds light on the ownership 
unbundling subject from the standpoint of antitrust law, policy and jurispru-
dence, focusing on energy sector cases16. A great importance of it stems from 
the fact that antitrust litigations can perhaps be sees as one of the most power-
ful tools the Commission uses de facto to enforce its policy goals. Willis and 
Hughes conclude: (i) The Commission does have a right to order ownership 
unbundling in non-merger proceedings, too, as a structural measure in indi-
vidual cases, after a thorough economic analysis, adhering to the principle 
of proportionality of the measure in relation to the nature and extent of the 
breach. (ii) The Commission is likely to be able to defeat any legal challenge 
based on arguments that it has infringed the European Convention on Human 
Rights17,18, or the principle of subsidiarity19, provided that the unbundling rem-
edy is proportionate to the breach of the EC antitrust law, as the Commission 
has already won a number of cases in courts where it commanded divestiture 
as a structural remedy under Art. 82 of the Treaty. Further, there were cases in 
which the Commission acted under Art. 81 of the Treaty by approving fi rm’s 
commitment to voluntary measures taken to avoid expensive, long lasting and 
risky litigations.
16  Willis and Hughes (2008); Diathesopoulos (2010).
17  Council of Europe (1953), Protocol 1, Art. 1, the right of peaceful enjoyment of his/her 
possessions.
18  Article 295 of the Treaty (European Community (2002), national property rights).
19  Article 1 of the Treaty, European Community (2002).
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For example, on 26 Nov. 2008 the Commission adopted a decision on commit-
ment addressed to E.ON for two suspected infringements of the EU antitrust 
law (manipulating the wholesale energy market by withholding, and buying 
system reserves favoring its affi liated generation plants). To avoid litigation, 
the E.ON had to commit to divest: (i) 5.000 MW of installed generation ca-
pacity; (ii) the high voltage grid together with the system operation activi-
ties. These were the fi rst cases ever in which a company agreed to sell very 
substantial amount of assets to avoid antitrust proceedings the Commission 
intended to start. For a brief exposure of this milestone antitrust case can refer 
to Chauve et al.20.
3.  CAN OPTIMAL TSO INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT BE 
IDENTIFIED?
From the literature review one can conclude that, probably, there is no fi rm 
evidence that any of the 3rd Package’s canonic forms is the best from the social 
cost-benefi t point of view. Moreover, the old arrangements themselves, like 
full vertical integration or legal unbundling within a VIU group, cannot be in a 
theoretically sound way regarded as neither better nor worse from these three. 
The reason for this lies in a fact that the TSO-related economic phenomena 
are too complex and dependent on too many variables, many of which being 
specifi c for a given electricity system with its unique inherited features. There-
fore, they cannot be emulated by simple and comprehensive theoretic models. 
Complex models, on the other hand, cannot be employed because they would 
require much wider statistical samples within each of the modeled structure, 
and longer time series than presently available.
Thus, our conclusion is that the very organizational form itself cannot be too 
important and it certainly cannot be the most important thing to take care of, 
provided each of the organizational settings is executed in a correct manner. 
But then, the problem is how to achieve this correctness itself.
When companies are totally independent, as in the OU case where former 
VIU and new TSO have different owners, all that is more-or-less important are 
normal strategic interactions between fi rms, requiring only a relatively mild 
ex-post control over possible collusive practices. An ISO arrangement requires 
more regulatory engagement, while ITO may pose truly big challenges in front 
of the regulatory system as a whole. One of the main characteristics of the 
TSO design-related literature is that the analyses have been performed under 
an assumption of regulatory effi ciency. Yet, this assumption might prove not to 
20  Chauve et al. (2009).
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be too strong. For example, Ugur21 concludes from his analysis of ex-ante and 
ex-post indicators of regulatory quality and their relationship with market out-
comes in three liberalized network industries (telecoms, gas, and electricity) 
of the EU-15 countries that the design of European market institutions is not 
optimal and that it may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright 
regulatory failure.
While Ugur’s work is of a practical kind, which is very important for getting 
a picture on true regulatory quality around Europe, we can refer to two sem-
inal theoretic works on regulation, too. Stigler22 formulates his famous theo-
ry of regulatory capture following an econometric analysis of effectiveness 
of regulation. Peltzman23 made a sort of generalization of Stigler’s theory by 
modeling a regulator as an agent which tries to maximize its own utility (and 
not necessary society’s) by choosing certain equilibrium mix between popular 
and private political support. In an earlier work by Stigler and Friedland24 
the effectiveness of electricity utility regulation throughout the USA in the 
pre-World war II time was studied. It was econometrically calculated how the 
explanatory variables (total population in cities larger than 25 thousand inhab-
itants; price of fuel; percentage of hydro generation; per capita state income; 
and dummy variable for presence of regulation in a state) infl uence average 
revenue per kilowatt-hour. Infl uence of regulation proved to be statistically 
insignifi cant in all analyzed years. Further, the relation between regulation and 
rate structure (the ratio between household and business tariffs) was studied. 
Finally, the effects of regulation on long term equity performance were investi-
gated. In both cases regulation had statistically insignifi cant infl uence. (These 
fi ndings certainly contributed to Stigler’s theory of regulation of 1971.) Stigler 
and Friedland explained their fi ndings essentially by informational asymmetry 
(in today’s vocabulary).
Not many economists today oppose to these basic theories and their more 
advanced later versions. Yet, for some reason, in many theoretical analyses 
regulatory system is being assumed effi cient, while seemingly it is not by the 
very nature of regulatory process. Thus, it is methodologically problematic to 
assume regulation was perfect while at the same time regulatory imperfect-
ness has been theoretically undisputed since decades.
Taking this basic fact into account may certainly change the otherwise hazy 
situation regarding the choice of optimal TSO institutional arrangement by 
21  Ugur (2009).
22  Stigler (1971).
23  Peltzman (1976).
24  Stigler and Friedland (1962).
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identifying the models less dependant on regulation more desirable. It is well 
known that either total ownership unbundling or total vertical bundling are the 
settings least dependant on regulatory action. Since the 3rd Package commands 
vertical unbundling in one of the three canonic ways, obviously, not much ma-
neuvering space is left, at least not in countries where regulatory institutions 
are still considerably weak. Such countries are often characterized by a joint 
state ownership over the regulator, the VIU, and the system operator (either di-
rectly or indirectly), which may complicate relations between these agents (e.g. 
for the ITO case these relations would be: state-regulator; VIU-ITO, VIU-reg-
ulator and regulator-ITO) to a further level. If a political goal was to have 
electricity transmission system operated independently of either generation 
or supply activities, and the European Parliament and Council did make it a 
goal by adopting the 3rd Package, then, having in mind that a non-negligible 
degree of regulatory failure is by the nature quite probable, the full ownership 
unbundling would presumably fi t best into this political framework. It is wor-
thy to note that American economists (and politicians) strongly favor wholly 
independent system operation, too25. Given American tradition in policy prag-
matism, as well as the fact that the whole idea of electricity market reform had 
originated in the USA, this is certainly something to take into account, too.
Unfortunately for politicians, theoretical economic analysis cannot provide a 
fi rm proof that either of the TSO models is the best. If it could, there would be 
less debating over the issue. However, unfortunately for the EC’s critics, the 
politicians successfully created a suffi cient amount of political will needed to 
pass the legislation that clearly prefers the OU model. As the 3rd Package ap-
peared in a democratic process, it is a demonstration of political will and thus 
does not have to be even economically justifi ed, let alone proved. This is an 
elementary fact overlooked by quite a few authors, as we argued above.
4.  TSOS’ ROLE IN ENERGY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. FORMULATION OF THE POLICY PROBLEM
Energy mix problem in electricity generation becomes more and more import-
ant throughout the World for two main reasons: emissions of carbon dioxide 
should be lowered because of global warming concerns, and fossil fuels need 
to be gradually replaced by alternative available energy sources as the fossil 
fuel reserves are limited. In electricity generation these two goals are to be 
achieved by two kinds of actions: implementing new generation plants that 
25  See e.g. Joskow, (2003).
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use renewable energy sources like wind, solar or geothermal power, and mak-
ing industry and living less energy-intensive by all sorts of energy effi ciency 
improvements, for instance investments in better thermal isolation of homes, 
fostering development of distributed generation aimed at lowering energy loss-
es in networks (at some expense in generation effi ciency, though), producing 
better electrical machinery that would spend less energy for the same func-
tionality, etc.
The European Commission adopted a policy of reaching twenty percents of 
total energy consumption from renewable sources until 202026. This policy 
has been turned into law: the Renewables directive27 sets out this goal as a 
fi rm obligation for the EU and also specifi es individual national targets which 
took into account specifi cs of each member state. Moreover, until 2050 the 
electricity generation should be 96-99 percent carbon-free28. The fact that to-
day’s technology still does not allow for full competitiveness of renewable 
sources as compared to conventional ones does not automatically remove a 
need to gradually change the organization of the industry so that renewable 
sources become able to compete in electricity markets with a minimized state 
intervention (and minimized or, ideally, abandoned subsidy schemes). This is, 
naturally, not attainable in the short term.  
Thus, the main political goal in the electricity sector for the decades to come 
should be formulated as follows: The renewable sources must eventually be-
come an integral part of electricity markets, and they must be subjected to 
the same market forces and price incentives. This is a precondition for the 
transition from fossil fuel-dominated system to a green one. One can rightfully 
fear that governments, prescribing various subsidy schemes that effectively 
isolate renewable sources from market signals, will gradually introduce a lot 
of market distortions by sustaining these schemes for a long time. Although 
one cannot really dispute the need for a state intervention in the beginning of 
the decarbonization process, there are questions of how well the intervention 
has been thought through, and are the mechanisms for government’s pull-out 
in place, or at least prepared.
26  European Commission (2010).
27  European Community, (2009a).
28  European Commission, (2011).
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4.2. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN FRONT OF THE GENERATION-
TRANSMISSION HALF OF THE SYSTEM
In this section we will concentrate on issues specifi c for generation and trans-
mission. The main assumption is that the biggest challenge in front of trans-
mission business is how to adopt a large sum of new (intermittent) renewable 
sources in relatively short time in an economically viable way and, yet, not 
jeopardize reliability of electricity supply. In that context, issues relevant for 
transmission and for generation are hardly inseparable.
Transmission networks as they are today had been built mostly to meet dif-
ferent type of requirements than the emerging ones. Historically, the grids 
had been planned to enable transmission of energy from domestic generation 
plants to domestic consumers (mostly on national level), aiming at electrical 
self-suffi ciency. Cross-border capacities had been built for technical purposes 
(security of network operation) and they usually had been too small to be able 
to carry signifi cant energy fl ows. System reserves had been planned and built 
to satisfy the regulation needs of electricity system mostly comprised of easily 
fossil fuel-fi red, nuclear, and hydro plants on the production side, and quite 
predictable load and prediction tools appropriate for relatively slow-changing 
load profi le on the consumption side.
The greenifi cation of the electricity system, combined with market reform, 
brings more complex challenges in front of networks and their operators. As 
regards market reform, transmission systems are expected to become more 
interconnected to allow for serious energy transfers across national borders. 
This is, for example, in line with the European electricity sector policy29. How-
ever, execution of the policy goes together with many practical problems and 
possible misunderstandings. 
One of the most prominent blunders is that every cross-border congestion is by 
defi nition bad and that it must be rooted out at any cost30. Another very popular 
blunder is that new interconnections would solve all the problems regarding 
“free” electricity trade (that is, a trade not infl uenced directly by government’s 
heavy regulatory rules and oversight), as they are needed to compensate for 
large-scale unevenness of generation plant geographical distribution and, may-
be more important, growing unevenness of geographical distribution of large 
wind generation plants across the internal European market. At the same time, 
the problem of insuffi cient capacities for ancillary services, especially second-
ary and tertiary regulation, which are necessary to have to enable larger pen-
29  See European Community (2009 b, and c).
30  It apparently follows from European Community (2009c).
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etration of intermittent renewables, is being constantly undervalued for some 
hardly understandable reason.
Although challenges that TSOs face in the greenifi cation process may seem 
technical in their nature, they are not. In fact, there are huge business challeng-
es that will soon need to be effi ciently managed by TSOs. When, for instance, 
operators say that they are getting a hard time when they have to operate the 
system with a substantial percentage of intermittent wind power production, 
this usually does not mean that they do not know how to run it, but rather that 
they do not have suffi cient regulation resources. As regards congestion man-
agement, it is solvable with still relatively cheap investments in transmission 
lines. However, the problem with regulation (physical balancing in the real 
time) does not go away with energy transferred through the transmission lines. 
It remains within the domestic system which must bear the burden of regula-
tion.
Fast regulation can be provided only by certain types of conventional power 
plants, which are technologically capable of this: hydro plants with reservoirs, 
or with pumped water storages, or otherwise by natural gas-fi red plants, pro-
vided the latter are connected to a gas transmission system which itself is 
balanced.
Thus, the increase in regulation capability of the power system is inevitably 
associated with hefty investments in the conventional generation sector. By 
the currently prevailing political will, the generation industry must be unbun-
dled from the transmission business, leaving TSOs essentially helpless when 
it comes to new regulation plant investments. Since that is so, the only way to 
make increase of overall regulation capability possible is to make the regu-
lation power plant investments attractive enough for potential investors. This 
is equivalent to say that the society must commit to “free” electricity market 
mechanisms and give up the state intervention in the electricity sector. Namely, 
an inrush of intermittent generation (notably, wind and solar) itself changes the 
economics of power system in a way that it lowers the market value of energy, 
ceteris paribus, and simultaneously increases the investment risks, especially 
for peaking plants31. The state subsidies which isolate renewable sources from 
market risks certainly do not help the situation.
However, the only way to phase out state subsidies is to make new renewable 
sources economically competitive with classical ones. Technology develop-
ment can bring renewables still closer to classical plants regarding overall long 
run incremental costs, on the one hand. On the other, enormous externality 
costs of pollution, which are still largely avoided, should be paid for by the in-
31  Steggals et al. (2011).
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dustry. Naturally, these new costs (CO2 emission costs being the most famous 
of them all) will be transferred towards the fi nal customers, and again, they 
will have to start paying. 
One of the problems encountered in small power systems is the night load 
minimum (e.g. Croatian system with about 3.100 MW of peak load can be 
considered small; the night minimum is about 1.400 MW). At least all coal-
fi red and nuclear plants (if any) have to fi t into this modest range. Moreover, 
recent strong political and legislative trends gave advantage in network access 
to renewable sources32. Thus, in most of the countries large wind farms already 
have preferential treatment as compared to fossil fuel and nuclear plants. In 
such circumstances it is not hard to imagine a situation where a larger new 
plant (say, 800 MW coal-fi red, or 1.000 MW nuclear) would be simply too 
large to be squeezed into a tight generation schedule unless shipping a sub-
stantial percentage of produced electricity abroad, especially during the night.
For that reason, investors in large (and usually more effi cient) generation units 
would be forced to ship the excess energy abroad, especially during the night 
time. This can increase investment risks as selling an energy that nobody cur-
rently needs may lower its prices considerably (even to negative values, as 
several times during 2009 on the German market). If there is no coupling with 
the foreign markets to sell, the investor would have to bear risks of cross-bor-
der charges, too. All these risks diminish as the market is bigger (with more 
players and more energy to exchange), i.e. more liquid. Connecting to interna-
tional markets increases liquidity, decreases risks, and usually enables usage 
of various fi nancial hedging devices.
Further, there occurs a question of system reserves, especially the tertiary re-
serve. A system operator has an obligation to keep available as much tertiary 
reserve capacity as big the largest generator inside its control area is. Suppose 
an investor wants to build a new 1.000 MW nuclear plant with a single gener-
ator in a control area with e.g. 3.100 MW peak load. Let the largest existing 
generator in such a system have 300 MW of installed power. Thus, local sys-
tem operator has to keep 300 MW of tertiary reserve. After new nuclear plant 
is built, the operator would have to get additional 700 MW of tertiary reserve. 
It is self-understood that in a bigger system it would be much easier and cheap-
er to obtain larger sums of tertiary reserve and the problem of the generator 
unit size would not be that drastic as in small systems. These are the reasons 
why it is economically better for system operators themselves to be a part of 
a larger system. Generators would benefi t, too, because diseconomies of run-
ning in a small system would naturally decrease. Or, to put it simpler: system 
32  European Community (2009a).
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operation itself exhibits economies of scale. Transmission system operators 
and electricity system as a whole profi t from including more control areas into 
a centrally operated system. Therefore, state policies should foster mergers of 
control areas beyond national borders instead of discouraging them. Yet, at 
least regarding this point, European states have not shown too much rationali-
ty, so that exploiting the system operations economies of scale like in the USA 
still seems decades far away when it comes to the EU or Europe in a wider 
sense. 
Regarding European policy towards ancillary services trade, apparently 
there is none. Otherwise, if anybody took care about this important detail, 
the European Commission would not effectively prevent cross-border trade 
of non-dispatchable services as it did in the Regulation on network access for 
the cross-border exchange33. Since the cross-border capacity allocation rules 
are based on forwardly traded scheduled capacities (except for the remaining 
capacities available for intra-day (real-time) allocations), and since capacity 
reservation is forbidden (except for technical purposes related strictly to se-
curity of system operation) they apparently prevent non-schedulable services, 
such as reserve power, to be traded over national borders, although ancillary 
service trade is obviously useful and benefi cial.
The question of competitiveness of renewable sources is not by any means sim-
ple nor one-dimensional. In Joskow34 the author argues that the currently used 
methods of comparison, the levelized cost being the most frequent one, do not 
produce realistic results in comparing classical with renewable technologies, 
and make the green technologies look more attractive in an economic sense 
than they realistically are. The levelized cost methods sum all the capital and 
operating costs during the plant’s life cycle and divide it by the quantity of en-
ergy it will produce in this time span. The idea of the calculation is to enable 
comparison between total long-run production costs per unit of generated elec-
tricity. Joskow shows that, since such studies have an underlying assumption 
that the economic value of the energy produced in all types of plants is the 
same, the results are misleading.
Electricity can take a number of marketable forms, so one cannot speak about 
the electricity as a single product. Instead, one can think of separate energy 
and reserve power markets such as base-load, peak-load, night base load, day 
base load, spinning reserve, secondary regulation, tertiary reserve, island op-
eration, black start, etc. (for more information see35). In this context, as an ap-
33  European Community (2009c).
34  Joskow (2010).
35  Stoft (2000).
103
D. Sabolić: Electricity transmission and EU rules for energy sector
proximation Joskow identifi es two main groups of generating plants: dispatch-
able and non-dispatchable. While dispatchable plants can easily adjust their 
generation power to a desired level that is derived from economic dispatching 
and system security criteria, the non-dispatchable cannot. In other words, dis-
patchable generators can work (and make money) when ever needed, while the 
others cannot. If by a political force the non-dispatchable sources were given a 
legally established precedence in network access, they would incur additional 
costs of system regulation. In any case, the energy produced in non-dispatch-
able generators has signifi cantly lower economic value. For this reason, more 
accurate models for comparison of concurrent electricity generation projects 
will have to be developed. Regarding only the renewable electricity technol-
ogies, geothermal plants are the nearest to the goal of being competitive with 
coal, combined-cycle natural gas, or nuclear plants, and this is because of their 
inherently dispatchable character. Wind farm technology is probably the next 
in line, while solar thermal and especially solar photovoltaic technologies may 
have to wait somewhat longer to become truly competitive34.
The economic factors that will certainly help renewable technologies to be-
come competitive in time even without state subsidies are as follows:
− the hydro potentials will eventually become mostly utilized, so there will 
be no signifi cant potentials for further construction of hydro plants; as pow-
er consumption will inevitably increase, these natural resources will grad-
ually become more and more scarce;
− the prices of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal) will inevitably keep in-
creasing for their reserves will gradually come to their ends (though, coal 
reserves will probably last quite longer than gas and oil);
− the carbon emission reductions will become tighter in time as a conse-
quence of increased political determination to signifi cantly slow down the 
pace of human-induced global warming; therefore, the prices of carbon 
emission rights (or their tradable fi nancial derivatives, to be more precise) 
will also keep increasing;
− in order to combat increasing carbon emission prices the companies might 
start investing in carbon capture and sequestration technologies (should 
they become truly effi cient with affordable prices); this will be just another 
manifestation of carbon emission reduction costs which will additionally 
burden both capital and operating costs (since these technologies increase 
fuel consumption, which in turn may also contribute to further fuel costs 
increases, too).
From today’s standpoint it is hard to tell when the above listed costs will be-
come signifi cant enough to draw true normalized costs of renewable and clas-
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sical electricity sources nearer to each other. However, one should note that it 
is not only a drop in renewable plant costs that will happen – rather, it is an 
increase in classical plant costs, too.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The most important strategic challenge in front of transmission system opera-
tors is large-scale adoption of renewable sources, many of them with intermit-
tent production characteristics (i.e., with unpredictable temporal variability), 
into transmission systems. This assumes the systems must be upgraded both 
in the physical domain and in the domain of the management philosophy. Re-
garding physical upgrades, the new transmission systems must become able 
of evacuation of considerable amounts of energy from many new renewable 
generating plants. They have to become able of transferring large-scale en-
ergy fl ows between macroscopic geographical areas with uneven distribution 
of new renewable plants. Nevertheless, this is merely an economic problem of 
network investments which may prove to be still relatively modest.
Transmission operation is a regulated business which must be suffi ciently fund-
ed to be able to fulfi ll its tasks. It seems that increased need for so-called ancil-
lary services would put operators to a fi nancial stress because the society (and 
regulators, too) would probably expect transmission tariffs not to increase (too 
much). Therefore, there will be pressures to reduce costs related to assets and 
labor, to make more room for additional costs associated with real-time system 
running. However, a combination of higher percentage of intermittent generators 
and lower asset-related spending could bring system reliability (i.e. short-term 
security of supply) nearer to a dangerous level. This in turn could pose new or-
ganizational challenges before management structures of the operators.
Regarding the economics of power system related to the process of system 
greenifi cation, which has a profound infl uence on transmission business, the 
main policy goal should be to abandon the philosophy of subsidies towards 
the green sources as soon as possible. Renewable generation defi nitely must 
become an integral part of electricity market. While the subsidies are justifi ed 
in the beginning of the greenifi cation, so that the process can successfully start 
after many decades of ignoring the external costs related to environmental 
pollution, which made clean energy sources uncompetitive in comparison with 
the classical ones, once the levelized costs of the two become comparable the 
renewable sources will have to assume a role in normal power markets, which 
includes forward trades, real-time (spot) market settlements (called balanc-
ing), including balance responsibility measured by normal spot prices. In other 
words, one day renewable sources must become just another market partici-
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pant offering their products and services on organized or non-organized mar-
kets, following the same market rules, and receiving the same price signals, 
as any other market player, regardless on technology they implemented for 
production of electric energy.
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